Jag hade hand om fem sessioner inom området webbläsarsäkerhet på OWASP Summit 2011. Vi hade deltagare från Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Internet Explorer, PayPal, Adobe Flash, IETF, ENISA samt några av de grymmaste webbhackers jag känner till – sirdarckcat, .mario, Gareth Heyes, Stefano Di Paola, och Thornmaker.
Nu har vi precis offentliggjort anteckningarna från dessa fem sessioner. Läs hur diskussionerna gick:
torsdag 24 februari 2011
fredag 4 februari 2011
Facebook-inställning för HTTPS
Facebook erbjuder nu en ny säkerhetsinställning – "Säker anslutning (https)". Antagligen en reaktion på "Firesheep" som uppmärksammades stort i höstas. Inte alla svenska Facebookanvändare kan göra den nya inställningen än eftersom Facebook lanserar det stegvis.
Du måste göra inställningen själv. Gör så här:
Du måste göra inställningen själv. Gör så här:
- Klicka på Konto uppe till höger
- Välj Kontoinställningar
- Klicka på Kontosäkerhet på sidan som öppnats
- Kryssa i "Säker anslutning (https)"
- Klicka på den blå knappen "Spara".
torsdag 3 februari 2011
Mario Heiderich till OWASP Sweden 7/3
Måndag 7 mars kommer Mario Heiderich hålla två föredrag för OWASP Sweden. Han ligger bakom t ex HTML5 security cheat-sheet och filterreglerna i PHPIDS. Jättekul att vi har kunnat bjuda in honom!
Presentation ett
The forbidden image - Security impact of Scalable Vector Graphics on the WWW
Scalable Vector Graphics are about to conquer the web. Unlike most of their raster based companions from the GIF, PNG and JPEG family, their vector based structure allows to display them on many different devices with various screen sizes without losing visual information. The open XML based SVG sources permit addition of meta data, helping even the visually impaired and blind to get the most out of these images. Additional modules, such as animations, events, SVG fonts, several scripting APIs and inclusion of hyper-links, other images and documents and even arbitrary content from cross-domain sources make SVG the perfect image format for the future WWW.
Nevertheless, a powerful standard such as SVG certainly poses a lot of risks. This presentation provides a close look at SVG from a security perspective. How can attackers abuse this mighty image format, which ways exist to execute script code and worse, and what should web developers and browser vendors consider when dealing with SVG. How will HTML5 change the way to work with SVGs and why does it matter for security professionals to know about things like SVG Tiny, in-line SVG, SVGz and other acronyms from a world where imaging and scripting collide? Besides many examples of malicious SVGs the talk will shed light on a novel filtering tool capable of filtering and sanitizing SVG images without loss of important content.
Presentation två
Locking the Throne Room - ECMA Script 5, a frozen DOM and the eradication of XSS
Cross Site Scripting has been a topic in countless presentations over the last decade. That easy to grasp but hard to solve problem has been shaking the web and caused major trouble on hundreds to thousands of high traffic and commercial and well as governmental websites. Mitigation techniques have been developed and discussed in depth - starting with restrictive content filters, educational programs and trainings, programmer's best practices and guidelines, proxy filters and many more. Still XSS remains a major problem far from being solved. The multilayer model on which the web relies causes too much reciprocity to find an easy cure - and the DOM as the actually affected layer is still lying unprotected open for the attacker.
This presentation introduces and discusses a novel approach of encountering XSS and similar attack techniques by making use of several new features included in the ECMA Script 5 specification draft. It will be shown how to create a simple JavaScript to seal important DOM properties, and take away the attackers ability to read and modify sensitive data in a tamper resistant and light-weighted way - without being "too loud". Modern browsers, such as Chrome 8 and Firefox 4, for the first time provide the possibility of creating and using client side IDS/IPS systems, written in JavaScript and running without special execution privileges. The presentation will show how these work, what the implications are, and what the future of XSS mitigation and eradication might look like.
Anmäl er konstnadsfritt här:
http://marioheiderich.eventbrite.com
Presentation ett
The forbidden image - Security impact of Scalable Vector Graphics on the WWW
Scalable Vector Graphics are about to conquer the web. Unlike most of their raster based companions from the GIF, PNG and JPEG family, their vector based structure allows to display them on many different devices with various screen sizes without losing visual information. The open XML based SVG sources permit addition of meta data, helping even the visually impaired and blind to get the most out of these images. Additional modules, such as animations, events, SVG fonts, several scripting APIs and inclusion of hyper-links, other images and documents and even arbitrary content from cross-domain sources make SVG the perfect image format for the future WWW.
Nevertheless, a powerful standard such as SVG certainly poses a lot of risks. This presentation provides a close look at SVG from a security perspective. How can attackers abuse this mighty image format, which ways exist to execute script code and worse, and what should web developers and browser vendors consider when dealing with SVG. How will HTML5 change the way to work with SVGs and why does it matter for security professionals to know about things like SVG Tiny, in-line SVG, SVGz and other acronyms from a world where imaging and scripting collide? Besides many examples of malicious SVGs the talk will shed light on a novel filtering tool capable of filtering and sanitizing SVG images without loss of important content.
Presentation två
Locking the Throne Room - ECMA Script 5, a frozen DOM and the eradication of XSS
Cross Site Scripting has been a topic in countless presentations over the last decade. That easy to grasp but hard to solve problem has been shaking the web and caused major trouble on hundreds to thousands of high traffic and commercial and well as governmental websites. Mitigation techniques have been developed and discussed in depth - starting with restrictive content filters, educational programs and trainings, programmer's best practices and guidelines, proxy filters and many more. Still XSS remains a major problem far from being solved. The multilayer model on which the web relies causes too much reciprocity to find an easy cure - and the DOM as the actually affected layer is still lying unprotected open for the attacker.
This presentation introduces and discusses a novel approach of encountering XSS and similar attack techniques by making use of several new features included in the ECMA Script 5 specification draft. It will be shown how to create a simple JavaScript to seal important DOM properties, and take away the attackers ability to read and modify sensitive data in a tamper resistant and light-weighted way - without being "too loud". Modern browsers, such as Chrome 8 and Firefox 4, for the first time provide the possibility of creating and using client side IDS/IPS systems, written in JavaScript and running without special execution privileges. The presentation will show how these work, what the implications are, and what the future of XSS mitigation and eradication might look like.
Anmäl er konstnadsfritt här:
http://marioheiderich.eventbrite.com
onsdag 2 februari 2011
Ny RFC om server-autentisering vid SSL/TLS
I dagarna kom en mycket intressant RFC som precis nått Proposed Standard RFC inom IETF.
Drakoniskt namn: Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Men den specar hur SSL-cert bör se ut och hur server-autentisering med X.509-cert ska gå till.
Tre intressanta saker som är med:
Drakoniskt namn: Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Men den specar hur SSL-cert bör se ut och hur server-autentisering med X.509-cert ska gå till.
Tre intressanta saker som är med:
- Sluta ange domännamn i certifikatets Common Name
- Börja ange domännamn i subjectAlternativeName dNSName
- Sluta med joker-certifikat, t ex *.owasp.org
tisdag 1 februari 2011
DoS:a Java med en siffra
Ni kanske läste inlägget om att DoS:a PHP med en siffra? Nu åker Java dit också (se Rick Regans och Konstantin Preissers bloggpost). Följande försätter Java i en oändlig loop:
Och följande hänger kompilatorn:
Vill ni testa? Bara att klona från BitBucket med Mercurial:
$ hg clone https://bitbucket.org/johnwilander/dosjava
Eller ladda hem en zip:
https://bitbucket.org/johnwilander/dosjava/downloads
... och sen köra "java RunHang" för att hänga Java eller "javac CompilerHang.java" för att hänga kompilatorn.
public class RunHang {
_public static void main(String[] args) {
_public static void main(String[] args) {
__System.out.println("Test:");
__double d = Double.parseDouble("2.2250738585072012e-308");
__System.out.println("Value: " + d);
_}
}
}
Och följande hänger kompilatorn:
public class CompilerHang {
_public static void main(String[] args) {
__double d = 2.2250738585072012e-308;
__System.out.println("Value: " + d);
_}
}
}
Vill ni testa? Bara att klona från BitBucket med Mercurial:
$ hg clone https://bitbucket.org/johnwilander/dosjava
Eller ladda hem en zip:
https://bitbucket.org/johnwilander/dosjava/downloads
... och sen köra "java RunHang" för att hänga Java eller "javac CompilerHang.java" för att hänga kompilatorn.
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